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Abstract
The distribution of firm performance is much dispersed. Rational behind it is still not fully
understood. According to upper echelon theory, top managers’ personal characteristics de-
termine firm-level performance. In the spotlight of research is the role of education, which is
often referred as proxy for human capital. I provide evidence that firms managed by CEOwith
MBA degree are on average 5-7 percentage points more productive. Meanwhile, prestige of
education is not important. Cross-sectional dataset combining 18 European countries and 15
sectors allows accounting for unobservables at country-sector level. I also address the gap in
the literature by analyzing the impact of different types of education. Evidence suggests that
the engineering degree is probably the worse option for CEO. Juridical background has limited
positive impact on firm performance. Education in economics, finance, accounting, marketing,
or fine arts has no effect.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades economists have turned to the problem of heterogeneity
of performance among firms. Many studies pointed to the significant scale of pro-
ductivity dispersion, which takes place both in developing and developed economies.
Syverson (2004b) on the sample of U.S manufacturing industries showed that a plant at
90th percentile of productivity distribution is almost twice more productive than one
at 10th percentile. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) found that ratio to be five to one in China
and India.
Little (1962), Geroski and Gugler (2004) pointed to fat-tailed distribution of firm
growth rate. Further studies (Stanley et al., 1996; Bottazzi et al., 2001) reveal tent-
shaped (log-Laplace) distribution. The heterogeneity on firm level is at the basis of
"new new" trade theory. For example, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) created
model, according towhichwithin-sector firmproductivity differences explain the struc-
ture of international trade and foreign direct investment. They provided supporting
evidence from 52 sectors across 38 countries.
The reasons behind heterogeneity of performance are not yet fully understood. Up-
per echelon theory gives one of possible explanations. The upper echelon is defined as
key decision-making group that stands between firm and its environment. Hambrick
and Mason (1984) stated that top managers’ background characteristics determine or-
ganizational outcomes, namely strategic choices and performance. Later studies, such
as Bertrand and Schoar (2003), confirmed predictions of theory. The role of manage-
ment practices was underlined, for example, by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), Bush-
nell and Wolfram (2009).
Present research follows the upper echelon theory. Chief executive officers (CEOs)
are on the top of firm’s organizational hierarchy. Usually they are those who have
to makes efforts for increasing of financial and market performance. The objective is
to reveal the impact of CEO’s educational background, which is one of key personal
characteristics. The direction of its influence on firm performance is not obvious.
On the one hand, level of education is often treated in literature as a good proxy for
human capital, knowledge, or intellectual abilities. Better educated CEO is supposed
to bemore intelligent and is better able to operate with information (Hambrick andMa-
son, 1984). According to Hitt and Tyler (1991) and Wally and Baum (1994) such man-
ager has better cognitive abilities and since could faster absorb and accept new ideas.
He or she is open to changes and therefore ready to employ novel managerial prac-
tices and even drastically change corporative strategy (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).
Bantel and Jackson (1989) found that better educated CEOs are also more involved in
implementing technical innovations and tend to invest more in R&D activities.
On the other hand, unobserved personal characteristics, as leadership, charisma
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or entrepreneurial skills, could as well affect overall firm performance. For example,
Bhagat et al. (2010) pointed that top managers are selected because of their higher
abilities. According to these authors, abilities consist of "observable and quantifiable
characteristics such as education and work experience, as well as unobservable and
potentially non-quantifiable characteristics". Darmadi (2013) states that "fast-growing
and high-performing firms were founded and are managed by people who are not
highly-educated". Because of the presence of unobservable characteristics, which are
much difficult to measure, the impact of observable ones (e.g. education or experience)
is not obvious.
Existing studies provide contradictory results concerning relationship between CEO’s
educational background and firm-level performance. One could distinguish two com-
peting branches of literature. At least four studies argue that education of CEO does
influence performance. Jalbert et al. (2002) employ a sample consisting of Forbes 800
U.S. firms and find that the prestige of CEO’s graduate school positively influences
return on assets (ROA). However, they get contradictory results while testing the re-
lationship between graduate degree and performance. It is significantly positive for
performance measured basing on Tobin’s Q and negative for return on assets (ROA).
Kong and Zhang (2010) studied interacting and feedback effects between human
capital and performance on the sample of publicly listed Chinese companies. They in-
vestigated the effect and efficiency of managerial human capital within different firm-
ownership structures. They found that senior manager’s educational level generates a
positive effect on the firm’s operating and market performance. Dominant state con-
trol diminishes this contribution margin. However, the existence of powerful large
minority shareholders has a positive effect.
Cheng et al. (2010) hypothesize that management demography of CEO is impor-
tant and reflects valuable resources of the firm. They examined 5339 firm-year obser-
vations of listed Chinese firms. It was found that various management demographic
characteristics (level of education, titles, age and tenure) of chairpersons significantly
influence corporate performance. These findings suggest that personal attributes of the
chairperson are appropriate proxies of human resources and managerial networking
competencies.
Darmadi (2013) provides evidence from Indonesia that the educational qualifica-
tions of board members and CEO matter, to a particular extent, for either return on
assets (accounting-based performance) or Tobin’s Q (market-based performance). For
example, CEOs holding degrees from prestigious universities perform significantly
better than those without such qualifications.
There are at least three studies where results suggest that there is no relationship
between CEO’s education and firm performance. For example, Gottesman and Morey
(2010) on the sample of 390 U.S. firms examined both type of education and selectivity
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of schools fromwhich CEOs have graduated. They found that educational background
of the CEO is not related to financial performance. Firms managed by CEOs with MBA
perform no differently than ones with CEOs who hold undergraduate non-liberal arts,
law or liberal arts undergraduate degrees. Simultaneously, firms headed by CEOs
frommore selective schools perform no better than ones with CEOs from less selective
schools.
Bhagat et al. (2010) employed much larger sample of 14500 CEO-years correspond-
ing to largest 1500 U.S. firms. They fail to find any significant relationship between
CEO’s education and long-term firm performance. They concluded that education is
not a good proxy for abilities. However, they provide empirical evidence that hiring
new CEOs with MBA degree leads to short-term improvements in performance. Their
results suggest that while education background appears to play an important role for
hiring of CEOs, it does not affect performance in the long run.
Lindorff and Jonson (2013) studied the relationship between business education of
CEOs of top 200 Australian companies and their firm’s performance. They proved the
absence of relationship between CEO’s MBA, business, or other qualification and firm
financial performance.
Present study contributes to the debate around the relationship between educa-
tional background of CEO and performance of firms. I employ diverse cross-sectional
sample that encompasses 18 European countries. Manager-firm matched sample in-
cludes 5127 active firms, which operate in 15 sectors defined according to NACE Rev.
2 classification. I contribute upon existing literature as all of studies are executed bas-
ing on one-country sample, which is usually the set of U.S firms.
The firm-level performance is measured by eight productivity ratios, namely return
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on capital employed (ROCE), earnings
before interest and tax (EBIT) margin and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation
and amortization (EBITDA) margin. Barnes (1987) underlined that financial ratios con-
trol for the size of financial information, which ensures comparability among firms.
Gibson (1987) surveyed chartered financial analysts and concluded that at least 90
percent of them treated ROA as a primarymeasure of performance. Jewell andMankin
(2011) pointed to the existence of 11 different versions of ROA ratio. They concluded
that ROA calculated basing on net income is the most common, but other versions
could have a valid use in the proper context. Hence, I include ROA, ROE and ROCE
calculated basing on both net income and profit (loss) before tax.
Performance distribution in the final sample is found to be notably skewed (Figure
1). This fact is consistent with results in literature and confirms large heterogeneity
among firms. There could be an issue of matching between most productive firms and
best educated candidates for CEO position. I apply t-test and find high probability
of endogenous matching for three of eight alternative dependent variables. They are
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excluded from further analysis.
I define four categories of CEO’s educational background according to two crite-
ria: holding of MBA degree and the prestige of attended institution. Firms headed by
CEOs without such qualifications are included in base group. The impact of MBA and
prestigious education is evaluated using OLS approach. The set of controls consists of
demographic characteristics of managers, firm-level financial characteristics and own-
ership variables. Present study is the first in this direction of literature to account for
unobservable variables that could influence performance at country-sector level. Cor-
responding fixed effect dummies are included in specifications.
Highlighted research question is closely related to the real life problem of selection
for the position of CEO. As was noticed by Gottesnan and Morey (2010) "shareholders
and prospective investors are in constant search of capable managers whowill increase
firm value. One of the few CEO characteristics that is publicly available is the CEO’s
educational background".
Several studies (e.g. Mintzberg, 2004; Pfeffer and Fond, 2002) underline that MBA
education seems to be irrelevant to practical tasks that managers have to deal with in
real business environment. Rynes et al. (2003) found that business schools empha-
size too much abstract theories and don’t put enough attention to improving practical
skills. Bennis and O’Toole (2005) as well as Hambrick (2007) figure out that business
schools are more focused on research education, rather than practical management.
Further criticism is related to weakness in developing innovative or risk-taking skills.
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) pointed that MBA programs stimulate students for
risk-averse behavior by accentuating methods of avoiding possible losses.
Despite mentioned alarming findings, MBA education is viewed by companies as
the desired background. According to GMAC Corporate Recruiters Survey Report
(2013), 75 percent of firms in 2013 had plans to hire MBAs. This figure augmented from
62 percent in 2010. MBA qualification is appreciated by employers due to professional
network, international outlook, and soft skills developed during studies.
Education of the candidate for CEO’s position remains an important selection crite-
rion. This is proved, for example, by statistics of Gilreath Consultantcy, which pro-
vides CEO hiring assistance for middle market private equity investors. Its head,
Jim Gilreath, points that "Undergraduate degree plus ideally an MBA always verified.
Proven experience can mitigate this but over the long haul; CEOs without a degree
haven’t made the cut in 95% of our searches".
Present research advocates that MBA is the effective way to train top managers.
Results suggest that such degree obtained by CEO contributes to the increase of per-
formance on average by 5-7 percent. This result should be interpreted as change in
performance in comparison to the base group. Impact of MBA degree on return on
equity is found to be at least twice stronger than the one on other measures of perfor-
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mance. Shareholders should prefer to hire candidates with such qualification.
Meanwhile, firms led by managers graduated from prestigious institutions don’t
show better performance. Such result could be explained by experience effect. Social
contacts and practical skills obtained during the carrier could overcome influence of
education. Miller at al. (2014) concluded that graduation from an Ivy League affects
performance at early stages of CEO’s careers. Later on, competition with better trained
peers supplemented by experience leads to mitigation of the impact of formal educa-
tion.
Hitt and Tyler (1991) pointed that the type of education could determine choice of
corporative strategic decision models. However, there is still very limited number of
studies which investigate impact of different majors of education followed by topman-
agers. Present research contributes to the literature by addressing this issue. Impact of
CEO’s education in economics, finance, accounting, marketing, engineering, law and
fine arts is analyzed. Results suggest that firm led by CEOs with engineering diploma
performs significantly worse. Juridical education has limited positive impact. All other
mentioned kinds of educational background generally don’t influence performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the dataset is introduced.
I present empirical strategy and hypotheses in Section 3. Results are reported in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 provides robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 summarizes obtained
results.
2 Data
Present research is conducted basing on the cross-sectional firm-level dataset for 2012.
Data is extracted from Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database. The broad sample consists
of 5127 active firms chosen according to the availability of the information about chief
executive officer. There are 6080 CEOs, which exceeds the number of companies be-
cause for some of them there is more than one CEO. In such firms two or more people
share functions of chief executive.
Further individual characteristics of CEOs are associated with firms. In case of
absence of such data I omit company from the sample. If a firm has multiple CEOs, the
first one with full available information is included. Final sample contains around 500
observations. The size of sample varies from one specification to another and depends
on the choice of dependent variable. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.
2.1 Dependent variable
Dependent variable across all specifications is the firm performance. Five alternative
measures are applied: (1) return on assets (ROA), (2) return on equity (ROE), (3) return
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on capital employed (ROCE), (4) earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) margin and (5)
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) margin. ROA,
ROE and ROCE are each calculated basing on either net income or profit (loss) before
tax. Consequently, final sample includes eight alternative dependent variables. Their
definitions alongside with formulas are reported in Table 2.
Return on assets (ROA) is a financial ratio calculated as percentage of net income or
profit (loss) before tax in total assets. The higher the ROA, the more money company is
making with less capital investment. Negative ROA indicates that the firm is investing
a high amount of capital into its production simultaneously receiving little income.
Return on equity (ROE) is the amount of net income or profit (loss) before tax re-
turned as a percentage of shareholders equity. It measures how much profit firm gen-
erates with the money shareholders have invested. Negative values of this financial
ratio are an alarming signal for investors. In such case the firm is rather losing, than
gaining the value. It typically happens at the beginning of corporative life cycle due to
significant capital expenditures. Economic downturns and recessions could negatively
affect ROE though reduction of demand.
Return on capital employed (ROCE) is a financial ratio that measures efficiency
with which capital is employed. It is calculated by dividing either net income or profit
(loss) before tax by employed capital. Higher values refer to more efficient use of
capital. The main difference from return on equity is that ROCE considers not only
common equity, but also debt and other liabilities. This indicator better reflects perfor-
mance of firms with significant debt.
Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) margin is equal to total operating earnings
before taking into account interest payments and income taxes divided by operating
sales. This ratio is a very rough approximation for cash flow from operations (CFO).
Negative EBIT margin means that sales are inferior to fixed costs. That could be typical
case at the early stage of corporative growth or shortly after the launch of a major new
product line.
Similar indicator of performance is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization (EBITDA)margin. Comparing to EBITmargin, this indicator doesn’t con-
sider effects of financial and accounting decisions. EBITDAmargin is equal to earnings
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization divided by operating sales.
2.2 Explanatory variables
The first group of independent variables, which is in the focus of interest, reflects the
education of chief executive officer. Dummy for MBA degree is equal to 1 if the man-
ager has MBA degree and to zero otherwise. Approximately 10 percent of chief ex-
ecutives in the final sample have such qualification. There are four dummies which
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measure the prestige of education. First, institutions are being viewed as more presti-
gious if they belong to some high strata of schools.
IvyLeagueGrad dummy equals to one if manager holds an undergraduate or grad-
uate degree from one of institutions participating in Ivy League. The schools united
under this label are among the most selective in the World. They admit each year the
most outstanding students basing on academic merits and social achievements.
The selection is also organized basing on results of SAT, GRE andGMAT tests. Their
higher scores are understood as an indicator of remarkable intelligence. Ivy League
universities have long-lasting reputation for exceptional quality of education. Only 6.3
percent of CEOs in the sample are graduated from such institution.
European analogue to Ivy League is the cohort of French "Grande Ecole" institu-
tions. Strict entrance conditions and high quality of training are common to them.
Therefore graduation from such school could be interpreted as signal of higher abili-
ties. GrandeEcoleGrad is the dummy which is equal to 1 if CEO has graduated from
school belonging to that group. There are approximately 7.5 percent of such managers
in the sample.
The second way to define the prestige of education is to consider the place of an
institution in the global ranking. Top25ARWU dummy is equal to one if manager
graduated from university that was rated in 2011 among top 25 universities in the
Academic Ranking ofWorld Universities. For the purpose of robustness check dummy
Top25QS is introduced. It reflects whether the institution belonged in 2011 to the group
of top 25 universities according to methodology of Quacquarelli Symonds. It should
be noted that Top25ARWU and Top25QS dummies are correlated by 87.27 percent.
Around 12 percent of CEOs have obtained degree from top 25 world universities.
I introduce seven dummy variables indicating different academicmajors: economics,
finance, accounting, marketing, engineering, law and fine arts. Each of them is equal
to one if CEO has obtained corresponding undergraduate or graduate degree. In the
sample there are tree dominating types of educational background: engineering (23
percent), economics (21 percent) and fine arts (21 percent). Degree in accounting is
held by 9.6 percent of managers. Diploma in law and finance were obtained by 3.6
and 2.7 percent of CEOs respectively. Only 7 managers (1.3 percent) have degree in
marketing.
Second set of independent variables consists of CEO’s demographic characteristics.
They are caught by age and gender. Gender is reflected by dummyMale, which equals
to 1 if CEO is male and to zero otherwise. Around 93 percent of chief executive officers
aremales. Kalleberg and Leicht (1991) hypothesize that male executives aremore likely
to manage in better way due to their higher propensity to innovate. Dezsö and Ross
(2012) and Lam et al. (2012) concluded about absence of relationship between female
CEOs and firm performance.
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However, recent empirical studies prove that firms led by female CEOs outperform
ones with male executives. Davis et al. (2010) showed that SMEs managed by women
perform significantly better because of their stronger market orientation. Khan and
Vieito (2013) executed study on panel of US firms between 1992 and 2004. They con-
cluded that the firm risk level is smaller when CEO is female. Peni (2014) points to
the positive relationship between presence of female CEOs or Chairs and firm perfor-
mance.
Another demographic variable controlled for is the age. The mean age in the final
sample is 54 years. Berry et al. (2000) found similar CEO’s average age, which is 56.7
years. Palia and Ravid (2002) estimated it to be 57.5 years. Lucier et al. (2003) showed
that newly appointed CEOs are on average 50 years old.
Results in the literature on the relationship between firm-level productivity and age
are ambiguous. For example, Thomas and Peyrefitte (1996) found positive impact of
CEO’s age on performance. Jalbert et al. (2002) concluded about absence of any rela-
tionship. Hambrick and Mason (1984) claim that younger CEOs are less conservative.
Similarly, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) stated that older CEOs are more conservative,
which could have both positive and negative impact.
At the same time, according to learning theory older CEOs have less physical and
mental strength needed for acquisition of ideas and implementation of new strategies.
MacCrimmon andWehrung (1986), Sundaram and Yermak (2007) found evidence that
older CEOs are more risk-averse. Dechow and Sloan (1991) put forward the horizon
problem, according to which CEOs at the age near retirement take efforts to maximize
current performance. For example, such managers reduce R&D expenditures in order
to preserve their personal salaries and benefits from decline. Gibbons and Murphy
(1992) claim that older managers focus on short-terms projects. However, Hirshleifer
(1993) found that youngest CEOs follow similar strategy in order to gain reputation.
Third group of independent variables consists of two ownership indicators. Dummy
ShareholderCEO is equal to one is CEO holds any of corporate shares and to zero oth-
erwise. This is possible in two cases: (1) CEO serves also as the chair of the board of
directors or (2) CEO receives equity-based compensation. In the sample approximately
5.5 percent of chief executives have status of shareholder. The limitation of analysis is
that the construction of dataset doesn’t allow distinguishing CEO duality and stock-
based incentive plans.
Dummy for majority shareholder is equal to 1 if one shareholder has more than
fifty percent of the total mass of outstanding shares and to zero otherwise. Big propor-
tion (76 percent) of firms in sample is controlled by majority shareholder. According
to expropriation hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) "as ownership gets beyond a
certain point, the large owners gain nearly full control and prefer to use firms to gen-
erate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders". Morck
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et al. (1988) found an inverse U-shaped relationship between firm value and own-
ership. Thomsen et al. (2006) concluded about a negative effect of majority owner-
ship. However, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) found no
statistically significant relationship between performance and the presence of major
shareholder.
The last group of independent variables combines firm-level controls. Logarithm
of sales is introduced as the proxy for firm’s size. There are many studies arguing
that firm performance is affected by size. Gooding and Wagner (1985) executed meta-
analysis of 31 studies of the size-performance relationship. They found that size and
productivity measured in absolute terms were positively related to each other. How-
ever, this relationship was not revealed for performance measured in relative (output-
input) terms. Later studies, for example, Kenyon and Mathur (1998), Darmadi (2011)
found positive impact of size.
The other control is the firm’s age. It is equal to number of years from the year of
incorporation until 2012. The average firm in the sample was established around 26
years ago. Batra (1999) and Kroszner (2000) pointed to the presence of link between
age and performance. According to life cycle theory, older firms are less flexible to
changes and since should perform worse than younger ones. Sorenson and Stuart
(1999) found empirical evidence that relatively new firms perform better. Meanwhile,
Majiundar (1997) employed the sample of 1020 Indian firms and found that older ones
are more productive and less profitable. Coad et al. (2013) studied impact of firm age
to performance on a panel of Spanish manufacturing enterprises. They concluded that
older firms have better productivity, higher profits, larger size, lower debt ratios, and
higher equity ratios. The explanation is that more mature companies are more capable
to convert growth of sales into growth of profits and productivity.
Gearing is an important financial characteristic that influences performance. It is
equal to total debt divided by total equity. This is measure of financial leverage and is
defined as the degree towhich firm’s activities are funded by owner’s funds comparing
to creditor’s funds. Stulz (1990) developed model predicting that debt can have both
positive and negative effects on firm performance. Opler and Titman (1994) concluded
that more leveraged firms demonstrate less performance during periods of downturns.
Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) found support for agency cost hypothesis formulated by
Jensen and Meckling (1976), according to which higher leverage is associated with
improved efficiency.
Another important factor that influences firm-level performance is the liquidity.
The most popular traditional measures of corporate liquidity are current ratio and
quick ratio. In present study the current ratio is implied, which is the measure of the
ability of the firm to convert assets into cash. It is equal to current assets divided by
current liabilities.
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3 Empirical strategy
The aim of research is to assess the impact of CEO’s education on firm-level perfor-
mance. In Section 2 three groups of educational variables were described. I put for-
ward two hypotheses related to relationship between dependent variables and vari-
ables of interest.
The graduates from more prestigious institutions and ones having MBA degree
should demonstrate superior abilities and deeper knowledge. There are two reasons.
First, such schools are high-selective and choose prospective students according to
social and academic achievements, results of tests for intellectual abilities. Business
schools also require certain amount of practical experience. Second, the quality of re-
ceived training is higher, which is proved by excellent reputation of institutions. Spe-
cific trait of MBA academic program is the combination of analytical and quantitative
training with developing of communication skills. Case studies and internships are
essential part of educational process.
Alumni of both MBA programs and most prestigious schools have more of social
capital. This advantage is related to network linkages acquired during studies. CEOs
withMBA degree have larger andmore diverse professional networks. Burt (1992) and
Belliveau et al. (1996) concluded that CEOs graduated from high selective institutions
have more connections to politicians and government servants. It allows them to gain
governmental contracts and lobby more favorable taxation, which results in better per-
formance. Pérez-González (2006) proved such prediction and pointed that firms led by
CEOs without Ivy League undergraduate degree demonstrate worse performance.
According to human capital theory, personal skills, which could be improved through
education, are the source of economic productivity (Becker, 1964). Upper echelon the-
ory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) states that superior abilities of CEOs positively in-
fluence firm-level outcomes. Consequently, I formulate two hypotheses concerning
background of CEO:
Hypothesis 1: MBA education has positive impact on firm performance.
Hypothesis 2: More prestigious education leads to better firm performance.
Both hypotheses are tested together within same regression models by applying
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method. There could be four categories of ed-
ucational background. Most commonly CEO doesn’t have MBA nor graduated from
prestigious university. Totally opposite case is when he or she has simultaneously
MBA degree and prestigious diploma. The last two categories refer to situations where
CEO either got MBA or graduated from one of prestigious institutions. Three categori-
cal dummies are included in regressions. The base group is the one consisting of firms
led by CEOs without MBA and having not prestigious degree.
Before proceeding to testing hypotheses, the issue of endogenous matching should
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be accounted for. There could be matching between best productive firms and best
educated candidates for the position of chief executive officer. It could occur if firm
prefers to hire CEO with MBA degree or more prestigious diploma. Better performing
firm is likely to offer superior incentives. Meanwhile better educated candidate could
choose the firm according to some other criteria. For example, Kramarz and Thesmar
(2013) underlined important role of networking for appointment decisions. Endoge-
nousmatching is also not much realistic due to the asymmetry of business information.
The endogenousmatching for each of eight alternative dependent variables is tested
by applying the t-test. Final samplewas divided into two groups according to the value
of educational variable of interest. The first test is executed for MBA dummy taken as
the measure of education. If the prospective CEO doesn’t have MBA degree, the firm
belongs to the first group and to the second one otherwise. In case of endogenous
matching the mean performance at the year of CEO’s appointment would be greater
in the first group. The same principle of testing is applied for dummies related to the
prestige of degree.
Results of tests for endogenous matching are further applied to the choice of de-
pendent variables. For five of eight dependent variables the absence of such issue is
proved. I consequently regress ROA (Net income), ROA (P/L before tax), ROE (Net
income), EBIT margin and EBITDA margin on educational variables, controlling for
demography of CEO, ownership and characteristics of firms. Demography of CEOs is
kept by gender and age. Ownership is controlled by introducing dummies for CEO
being shareholder and for the presence of majority shareholder. Firm characteristics
are kept by firm’s age, logarithm of sales, gearing, current ratio and its square.
The reason behind inclusion of current ratio both in linear and quadratic forms is
that the U-shape of relationship between performance and current ratio is supposed
to hold. Richards and Laughlin (1980) argue that investors should focus on two things
at same time: (1) avoiding default situations by emphasizing firm’s ability to cover
its obligation with cash flow under normal conditions and (2) keeping operating cash
flows sensitive to incidences of decrease of sales and earnings. Firms with fewer cur-
rent assets will have problems with continuing their operations. Meanwhile, too big
current assets are the signal that the return on investment is not in perfect condition
(Horne and Wachowicz, 2000).
Unobservable country-specific and (or) sector-specific characteristics could be cor-
related with included explanatory variables. Therefore omitted variable bias could
prevent getting correct estimations. Gottesnan and Morey (2010) controlled for sector-
specific fixed effects. They gave example that MBA skills are less appropriate for man-
aging of the pharmaceutical company than of the bank.
I consequentially include in regressions country fixed effects, sector fixed effects
and country-fixed effects. The latter ones mean that unobservable characteristics spe-
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cific to concrete sector in concrete county are taken into account. Firms in the final
sample represent 18 European countries and 15 sectors. Sector is defined according to
NACE Rev. 2 statistical classification of economic activities.
There is concern that firms with unusual pattern of correlation between perfor-
mance and gearing or performance and current ratio could influence results of esti-
mations. These companies are of two types: (1) ones having huge gearing or current
ratio and (2) ones showing extremely high or low performance alongside with gearing
or current ratio close to zero.
Observations that significantly outstand from others are called outliers. In order
to detect them I apply blocked adaptive computationally efficient outlier nominators
(BACON). This method was introduced for the first time by Billor et al. (2000). I
employ the first version of identification procedure, which is based on Mahalanobis
distances. Outliers are (1) 5 percent of the farthest points for correlation of performance
with current ratio and (2) 1 percent of the farthest points for correlation with gearing.
Estimated equations could be represented in following general form:
PERFi = 0 +1  MBAi +2  Prestigei +3  MBAPrestigei + 1  D0i + 2 O0i +
+3  F0i +   ci  si +"i
Coefficients of interests are 1, 2 and 3. They correspond to impact of CEO’s MBA
degree, prestigious education and MBA from prestigious schools on firm performance
PERFi. I introduce demographic, ownership and firm-level controls denoted by vec-
tors D0i , O
0
i and F
0
i . Country and sector fixed effect dummies are ci and si, respectively.
The impact of different majors of CEO’s education on firm performance is tested by
regressing each of eight dependent variables on dummies for education in economics,
finance, accounting, marketing, engineering, law and fine arts. In additional to the
main set of controls I include in regressions IvyLeagueGrad dummy.
Robustness checks are executed by testing the impact of alternative measures of
prestige of education. First, instead of IvyLeagueGrad, I employ GrandeEcoleGrad
dummy. Dummy MBAGrandeEcole corresponds to the case where CEO that gradu-
ated from French Grand Ecole also possesses MBA degree. The effect of MBA or more
prestigious education is estimated in comparison to the case of absence of such de-
grees. Another robustness check is done by accounting for the position in QS ranking
instead of the one in ARWU.
Second, the impact of alternatively defined CEO’s education is tested. I regress
dependent variables on MBA and IvyLeagueGrad included separately. Furthermore,
the effect of business degrees other than MBA is investigated. Additionally, I expand
the list of Ivy League institutions by Stanford and University of Chicago and compare
results with ones for Ivy League.
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4 Results
The issue of endogenous matching is the first thing to be addressed before proceeding
to further analysis. As was discussed in Section 3, the t-test is applied for that pur-
pose. The principle is to divide sample into two sub-groups according to the mean-
ing of educational variables. The preliminary stage of testing consists of two-group
variance-comparison test that allows identifying whether variances of two sub-groups
are equal or not. At the second stage t-test is applied taking into account equal or un-
equal variance. Three alternative hypotheses about difference between performances
of two sub-groups are tested. Hypothesis of interest is that the difference between
average performance of group of firms with better educated CEOs and the one with
lower educated managers is below zero.
Results of testing for endogenous matching are reported in Table 3. First, the al-
ternative hypothesis of interest for MBA dummy is significant in three of eight cases.
More precisely, it is significant at five percent level while taking ROE (P/L before tax)
and ROCE (P/L before tax) as measures of performance. Lower statistical significance
is observed for ROCE calculated basing on net profit. As the concern of endogenous
matching is high for these dependent variables, they are excluded from analysis while
testing hypotheses 1 and 2.
The same method is applied for testing for possible matching between more pro-
ductive firms and manager graduated from universities belonging to Ivy League. As
it is reported in Table 3b, none of alternative hypotheses are significant. On average
performance of firms where CEOs with more prestigious diploma were hired, was the
same as of ones which employed CEOs without such diploma. This result is confirmed
in case of defining prestigious education as graduation from one of top 25 institutions
according to Academic Ranking of World Universities.
Another important step to be taken before applying OLS method is to detect out-
liers. Employed procedure is discussed in Section 3. In further discussion results for
unrestricted samples with outliers are compared to results obtained after removing
outliers. Figures 2-6 report correlations between five dependent variables and two
important financial indicators. There are 28 different firms that were identified as out-
liers. It should be noted that only two of them are led by CEOswithMBA qualification.
Outliers are marked graphically with crosses (X).
The graphs underwritten by letter "a" refer to correlation with current ratio. There
are 14 firms marked as outliers and almost all of them (13) show high values of current
ratio. Four of these companies operate in the sector of financial and insurance ac-
tivities. Information and communication sector as well as professional, scientific and
technical activities are represented by three firms each. These sectors largely employ
intangible assets.
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The graphs under letter "b" report correlation between different measures of firm
performance and gearing. There are 14 firms marked as outliers. Abnormally high
values of gearing, which is the proxy for financial leverage, are shown by 6 of them.
Three of these companies operate in the sector of wholesale and retail trade. They
participate in the final steps of distribution of merchandise goods.
The results of testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 are represented in Tables 4a and 4b. As it
was discussed in Section 3, there could be four categories of educational background.
Coefficients of three categorical dummies are reported. The analysis is based on com-
parison with performance of firms led by CEOs which don’t haveMBA nor prestigious
degree.
According to Table 4a, CEO’s MBA degree from non - Ivy League university im-
proves performance by 4-16 percentage points. After removing outliers the effect be-
comes less dispersed: from 4.21 to 12.6 percentage points. It should be noted that the
magnitude of impact is more than twice bigger for return on shareholders’ equity com-
paring to other dependent variables. Shareholders’ decision to hire CEO having MBA
is the right way to improve pay-off of their investments.
Overall the impact of MBA education along is found to be statistically significant.
For ROA and ROE the coefficient is significant at 5 percent level. The effect on EBITDA
margin is stronger with significance at 1 percent level. At the same time, there is weak
impact on EBIT margin, which is significant only for non-restricted sample. The differ-
ence between these two measures is in capital expenditures.
The impact of IvyLeagueGrad dummy on EBITDA margin is around 6 percentage
points and is significant at 5 percent level. That magnitude is similar to the effect of
MBA. However, this result is not robust to the change of definition of performance.
For all other alternative dependent variables the effect is not statistically different from
zero. It means that firms led by CEOs having diploma from one of Ivy League institu-
tions don’t show significantly better results. This is true even for chief executives who
supplementary possess MBA degree.
The definition of more prestigious education as graduation from one of American
Ivy League institutions could be disputable. The alternative approach is to definemore
prestigious university as the one belonging to top 25 of ARWU ranking. Table 4b re-
ports similar OLS estimations. The significance of MBA degree is exactly the same as
in Table 4a. However, the magnitude of its impact is higher. It is from 4.24-16.4 per-
centage points for non-restricted sample to 4.51-12.8 for specifications without outliers.
The graduation from one of top 25 universities in theWorld seems to have positive, but
still not significant impact.
The impact of different types of educational background is tested by consequent
regressing of all eight dependent variables on dummies for education in economics,
finance, accounting, marketing, engineering, law and fine arts. For each type OLS
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approach is applied both on non-restricted samples and after removing outliers. The
set of controls is described in Section 2 and is the same across all specifications. The
additional control variable is the IvyLeagueGrad, which is included to catch the pres-
tige of education. I introduce country-sector fixed effects to account for unobservable
characteristics. OLS coefficients are reported in Table 5.
The impact of education in economics or marketing is imprecise, large standard
errors are observed in many cases. However, their coefficients are positive for six of
eight dependent variables. This result is consistent with Buyl et al. (2011). Their expla-
nation revolves around better intra-board communications established by CEO with
background in marketing, which tends to share ideas and coordinate efforts. Coeffi-
cient of dummy for finance, on the contrary, has mainly negative sign, but is as well
not statistically different from zero.
CEO’s education in engineering is found to likely detriment the corporative perfor-
mance. Its coefficient becomes significant for three of eight dependent variables after
removing outliers. Existing studies (Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Finkelstein and Ham-
brick, 1996; Barker and Mueller, 2002) suggest that CEOs with technical education de-
vote more financial resources to R&D activities. Steensma (1998) concluded that top
executives with technical education have more comprehensive understanding of tech-
nologies and innovations.
Many studies (e.g. Kim and Lyn, 1990; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1991) advocate that
R&D investments pay off in improved productivity. On the other hand, more recent re-
searches point to limitations of such conclusion. Morbey (1988) showed strong impact
of R&D spendings on further growth in sales. However, he found weak correlation be-
tween R&D intensity and growth in profitability. García-Manjón and Romero-Merino
(2012) concluded that only high-technology firms obtain clear benefits from their R&D
investment.
The way how R&D resources are managed is more important for productivity than
the absolute or relative level of technological investment. CEOswith engineering back-
ground are more prone to invest in R&D, but could lack of skills and experience re-
quired for successful managing of financial flows. Financial skills are more common
to CEOs with MBA degrees. Graham and Harvey (2002) found that managers with
such qualification more frequently follow academic advice and employ present value
techniques for evaluation of new projects.
Goh et al. (2008) reported that absolute majority of technical undergraduate and
postgraduate programs are not adapted to needs of management. They suggest trans-
formation of engineering education. First, financial skills should be introduced into un-
dergraduate programs as an elective. Second, team-related and communication skills
should be practiced throughout technical courses. Third, at post-graduate level the
management skills need to be taught in the context of particular industry.
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Strictly positive effect is demonstrated by juridical background. However, it is
weakly significant only for two dependent variables. Dummy for law is not robust
to removing outliers. The effect could be driven by firms having high financial lever-
age. CEO with education in law could be more efficient in more indebted firms. Such
manager better knows how to oppose to the interests of creditors through juridical
channels.
Tables 4a and 4b report exclusively OLS estimations for coefficients of interest.
Meanwhile, the direction of impact of control variables could contribute to under-
standing of determinants of firm-level performance. Detailed OLS results are repre-
sented in Appendix A. The construction of regression tables is identical. In first two
columns results with country fixed effects are represented. In next two columns sector
fixed effects are included. In the last two columns I report results for regressions with
country-sector fixed effects. In all tables specifications in columns number 2, 4 and
6 are given for sub-samples obtained from initial sample after exclusion of BACON
outliers.
The first group of controls combines demographic characteristics of chief execu-
tives. The age of CEO, which is the proxy for experience, influences performance pos-
itively. Female managers are found to be better than their male collogues. This result
is consistent with recent findings of Davis et al. (2010), Khan and Vieito (2013) and
Peni (2014). It should be noted that both demographic variables are not statistically
significant and since much weight can’t be given to such result.
Ceteris paribus corporative performance is 4.52-10.3 percentage points lower in the
presence of majority shareholder, which owns at least 50 percent of shares. This could
be explained by information asymmetry between majority and minority shareholders.
According to expropriation-of-minority-shareholders hypothesis, top management of
such firm puts in place strategies that increase the wealth of majority to the prejudice
of minority. Confirming that mentioned theory results are obtained by Bange and De
Bondt (1998), Bushee (1998), Kim and Yi (2006).
Besides the effect of the presence of majority shareholder I investigate the impact
of CEO’s possession of corporative shares. This could occur in case of implementation
of equity-based long term incentive plans and compensation packages. Such measures
were recognized in the literature to play important role in mitigation of the conflict of
interests between managers and shareholders. For example, Ozkan (2011) found posi-
tive impact of equity-based CEO compensation on firm performance. Meanwhile, she
points to the decrease of the effect with longer CEO tenure. Yermack (1995) noticed
that such type of compensation could contribute to overcoming of the horizon prob-
lem. Dechow and Sloan (1991) defined it as willingness of CEOs of near retirement age
maximize their current compensation by implementing of risky projects with higher
short-term performance.
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At the same time, CEO could be shareholder in case of duality, when he or she is
also the chair of the board of directors. According to agency theory, CEO duality could
decrease firm performance due to undermining of monitoring and control function of
the board (Jensen, 1993; Daily and Dalton, 1994; Davidson et al., 2004). Meanwhile,
unification of command functions and higher accountability in corporate leadership
possibly leads to positive impact (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Brickley et al., 1997;
Bhagat and Black, 2001). Significant at-risk wealth of CEOs leads to higher motiva-
tion for manager to put efforts for maximization of shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and
Murphy, 1990).
I found limited evidence that firm performance worsens if its CEO possesses cor-
porative shares. ShareholderCEO dummy has negative sign in most cases. However,
it is significant only in the specifications with ROE (net income) and EBITDA margin
as dependent variables. Unfortunately, construction of employed sample doesn’t per-
mit to distinguish observations with equity-based compensations from ones with CEO
duality. However, the overall negative sign of ShareholderCEO could be interpreted
the prevalence of the negative impact of CEO duality over positive one of equity-based
compensation schemes.
The last group of controls consists of firm-level characteristics. The impact of age
of company is found to be ambiguous and not significant. Coefficient that corresponds
to logarithm of sales, which is proxy for size, is significant at 5 percent level only if
performance is measured as EBITDA margin. Gearing impacts performance strongly
negatively with significance in majority of specifications at 1 percent level. As gearing
is proxy for financial leverage, more indebted firms demonstrate less financial produc-
tivity.
Coefficients of current ratio and squared current ratio have opposite signs for all
five alternative dependent variables. Results suggest U-shape functional form of re-
lationship between firm performance measured as return on equity and current ratio.
That means that the highest performance is shown by those companies, which hold
either very low or very high amounts of liquid assets. Relationship with EBIT and
EBITDA margins is close to inverted U-shape. In this case firms with medium ability
to pay back short-term obligations are the most productive ones.
5 Robustness checks
Represented in Section 4 results suggest that CEO’s MBA education is an important
factor that positively influences performance of firms. The objective of this section is
to test the result by accessing alternative categories of educational background. The
GrandEcoleGrad dummy is employed in alternative to IvyLeagueGrad. Further the
position in Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) ranking is taken instead of one in ARWU rank-
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ing. Results of robustness checks are reported in Appendix B.
Coefficients in columns 1 and 2 of Table B1 represent OLS estimations of the im-
pact of MBA education. They should be compared to ones in columns 1 and 2 of Table
4a. The change of definition of prestigious group of institutions doesn’t affect the sig-
nificance of coefficients for MBA degree along. Approximately same magnitude is
observed. Other types of education (columns 3-6) are not significant, similarly to main
results. The only one difference is that MBA from Grande Ecole becomes significant
for three dependent variables after removing BACON outliers.
Second robustness check is executed by replacing Top25ARWUwith Top25QS dummy.
In the sample there are no CEOs with MBA degree from top 25 universities according
to QS ranking. Coefficients of MBA are smaller in magnitude, comparing to ones in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 4b, but are significant at exactly same levels. Therefore ab-
sence of statistical significance was confirmed for CEO’s prestigious education.
Results of further robustness checks are reported in Table B2. I regress dependent
variables on MBA and IvyLeagueGrad separately. Corresponding coefficients are rep-
resented in columns 1-2 and 7-8. CEO’s MBA degree holds positive sign, but becomes
less significant. The IveLeagueGrad is confirmed to have no impact on firm-level per-
formance. Following Miller et al. (2014), I define "Expanded Ivy" list by including
Stanford and University of Chicago. In all specifications I control for the same set of
CEO demographic and firm characteristics as in the main analysis.
Alternative definitions of business education are also included in robustness checks.
In columns 3-4 of Table B2 I list coefficients corresponding to the effect of non-MBA
business degrees. They are negative, but not statistically different from zero. While
defining business education as either MBA or another business-oriented major, I ob-
tain positive and not significant effect on firm performance. Therefore MBA degree is
more relevant than other business-related educational programs.
6 Conclusion
Paper addresses the role of chief executive officer’s educational background in deter-
mining firm-level performance. The impact of four different types of CEO’s education
is studied. The base type is the non-MBA degree delivered by not prestigious institu-
tion. The impact of other types on firm-level performance is estimated in comparison
to that baseline educational background.
MBA degree from not prestigious institution is found to have positive and signif-
icant impact on firm performance. The firm led by CEO who obtained such degree
performs on average 5-7 percentage points better than those with CEO having base-
line education. Corresponding coefficient is significant in most cases at 5 percent level.
The explanation behind it is in diverse training received by MBA students. They ac-
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quire both analytical and practical skills that are essential for corporative management.
CEO with such degree also has broader professional network.
MBA degree has approximately twice stronger impact on return on equity, compar-
ing to other measures of performance. In that case shareholders would expect better
return from their investments. They should implement in practice such result by hir-
ing candidate with MBA for the position of CEO. Present research contributes to the
debate in literature around effectiveness of business education.
More prestigious education of CEO is found to have no impact on performance.
Same is observed for MBA delivered by prestigious schools. This result is consistent
with findings of Gottesman andMorey (2010). Their explanation could be called "effort
effect". Graduates of less prestigious institutions are initially discriminated. They have
to work harder and longer to obtain the same post. An appointment as CEO signals
that their performance capabilities are recognized to be at least at the level of peers
with more prestigious diploma.
There could be an alternative explanation related to experience and networking ef-
fects. Initially alumni of prestigious schools have advantages due to the fact of being
pre-selected, among other things, according to the level of intelligence. Further they
receive superior training. However, manager starts to acquire social capital (network
linkages) and applied skills since the beginning of career. At some point formal pres-
tige education becomes no more the key factor determining performance of managed
firm.
The impact of different academic majors is also investigated. CEO’s engineering
education is found to have negative effect on firm performance. Possible explanation is
that engineering educational programs don’t contribute to developing of financial and
soft skills. There is limited evidence that firms with CEO having degree in law show
better performance. Effect becomes insignificant after removing outliers, which means
that it could be driven by firms having high financial leverage. Possible reasoning
behind positive effect for indebted firms is that CEO with juridical background could
better know how to oppose interests of creditors in favor of corporation. Academic
majors in economics, finance, accounting, marketing and fines arts are found to be not
significant.
The limitation of present research is related to employed dataset. The sample doesn’t
allow controlling for network effects. Meanwhile, they are declared in the literature to
significantly impact performance. First, networking facilitates direct transfer of infor-
mation. For example, Hochberg et al. (2007) concluded that venture capital funds
with better networks demonstrate significantly better fund performance. Second, so-
cial networking also permits to better assess the quality of management. Cohen et al.
(2010) found evidence that fund managers make more profit from trading of stocks of
firms with which they have social connections. Kramarz and Thesmar (2013) also re-
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veal correlation between the network of board of directors and network of CEO, which
influences appointment decisions.
Further research should be executed basing on enriched panel dataset. Such con-
struction of sample would allow controlling for unobserved variables that are con-
stant over time. Time dimension is essential for disentangling short-term and long-
run effects. Analysis could also be expanded by inclusion of individual-level data on
compensation, particularly emphasizing the role of equity-based compensation plans.
Similar methodology could be applied for the study of the relationship between edu-
cational backgrounds of other top managers and firm performance.
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8 Tables and figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean St. Div. Min p25 p50 p75 Max N
Panel A: Firm performance
ROA (Net income) 5.24 15.0 -94.9 0 3.83 8.94 98.9 703
ROA (P/L before tax) 7.17 16.1 -94.2 0.82 5.59 12.2 83.2 704
ROE (Net income) 10.3 56.4 -743.7 0 10.0 23.2 290.5 703
ROE (P/L before tax) 19.4 71.0 -738.4 2.03 14.0 34.8 736.3 708
ROCE (Net income) 9.40 25.7 -167.2 1.31 7.68 16.0 145.2 503
ROCE (P/L before tax) 13.8 33.0 -154.6 2.32 9.78 21.7 225.6 508
EBIT margin 7.76 22.2 -95.6 1.09 5.32 11.6 99.9 690
EBITDA margin 11.6 21.3 -88.0 2.98 7.88 16.3 98.9 581
Panel B: Education of CEO
MBA 0.100 0.30 0 0 0 0 1 522
IvyLeagueGrad 0.063 0.24 0 0 0 0 1 711
Top25ARWU 0.12 0.33 0 0 0 0 1 711
GrandeEcoleGrad 0.15 0.35 0 0 0 0 1 711
top25QS 0.12 0.33 0 0 0 0 1 711
Economics 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 0 1 522
Finance 0.027 0.16 0 0 0 0 1 522
Accounting 0.096 0.29 0 0 0 0 1 522
Marketing 0.013 0.12 0 0 0 0 1 522
Engineering 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 0 1 522
Law 0.036 0.19 0 0 0 0 1 522
Fine Arts 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 0 1 419
Panel C: Demography of CEO
Age of CEO 54.1 7.15 30 49 54 59 75 711
Male 0.93 0.26 0 1 1 1 1 711
Panel D: Ownership
ShareholderCEO 0.055 0.23 0 0 0 0 1 711
Majority shareholder 0.76 0.43 0 1 1 1 1 711
Panel E: Firm characteristics
Firm’s age 25.6 25.3 1 10 18 30 191 711
log(Sales) 10.6 3.42 0.70 8.46 10.5 12.9 19.0 711
Gearing 79.2 136.0 0 2.26 26.9 93.6 928.4 711
Current ratio 3.94 8.78 0.010 1.06 1.60 2.87 90.3 711
Current ratio square 92.6 557.0 0.000100 1.12 2.56 8.24 8159.5 711
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Figure 1: Performance distributions
Table 3a: Testing for endogenous matching for MBA
Dependent MBA degree Unequal Ha: diff<0 Ha: diff !=0 Ha: diff>0
variables No Yes variance P(T<t) P(|T|>|t|) P(T>t)
ROA (P/L before tax) 329 28 No 0.333 0.667 0.667
ROA (Net income) 333 27 No 0.370 0.740 0.630
ROE (P/L before tax) 303 26 Yes 0.022 0.043 0.978
ROE (Net income) 305 26 Yes 0.381 0.763 0.619
ROCE (P/L before tax) 197 15 Yes 0.050 0.100 0.950
ROCE (Net income) 197 15 Yes 0.093 0.186 0.907
EBIT margin 235 22 No 0.359 0.719 0.641
EBITDA margin 194 16 No 0.157 0.313 0.843
Notes: Firms are divided into two groups according toMBA dummy. Null hypothesis: average performances
of two groups are equal at the year of CEO’s appointment (diff=0). Three alternative hypotheses are tested.
If firms led by CEOs with MBA showed better performance (diff<0), the endogenous matching is likely to
occur. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Table 3b: Testing for endogenous matching for IvyLeagueGrad
Dependent IvyLeagueGrad Unequal Ha: diff<0 Ha: diff !=0 Ha: diff>0
variables No Yes variance P(T<t) P(|T|>|t|) P(T>t)
ROA (P/L before tax) 383 21 No 0.746 0.508 0.254
ROA (Net income) 390 22 No 0.705 0.591 0.295
ROE (P/L before tax) 356 20 Yes 0.883 0.234 0.117
ROE (Net income) 360 21 Yes 0.880 0.240 0.120
ROCE (P/L before tax) 241 15 Yes 0.878 0.244 0.122
ROCE (Net income) 241 16 Yes 0.884 0.232 0.116
EBIT margin 284 12 Yes 0.817 0.366 0.183
EBITDA margin 224 11 Yes 0.611 0.777 0.389
Notes: Firms are divided into two groups according to IvyLeagueGrad dummy. Null hypothesis: average per-
formances of two groups are equal at the year of CEO’s appointment (diff=0). Three alternative hypotheses are
tested. If firms led by CEO that graduated from an Ivy League institution performed better (diff<0), the endoge-
nous matching is likely to occur. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
Table 3c: Testing for endogenous matching for GrandeEcoleGrad
Dependent GrandeEcoleGrad Unequal Ha: diff<0 Ha: diff !=0 Ha: diff>0
variables No Yes variance P(T<t) P(|T|>|t|) P(T>t)
ROA (P/L before tax) 338 66 Yes 0.908 0.184 0.092*
ROA (Net income) 341 71 Yes 0.623 0.754 0.377
ROE (P/L before tax) 317 59 No 0.791 0.418 0.209
ROE (Net income) 321 60 Yes 0.876 0.248 0.124
ROCE (P/L before tax) 213 43 Yes 0.850 0.300 0.150
ROCE (Net income) 214 43 Yes 0.878 0.244 0.122
EBIT margin 253 43 Yes 0.124 0.249 0.876
EBITDA margin 202 33 Yes 0.055 0.110 0.945
Notes: Firms are divided into two groups according to GrandeEcoleGrad dummy. Null hypothesis: average perfor-
mances of two groups are equal at the year of CEO’s appointment (diff=0). Three alternative hypotheses are tested.
If firms led by CEO that graduated from a French Grand Ecole perform better (diff<0), the endogenous matching is
likely to occur. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
Table 3d: Testing for endogenous matching for Top25ARWU
Dependent Top25ARWU Unequal Ha: diff<0 Ha: diff !=0 Ha: diff>0
variables No Yes variance P(T<t) P(|T|>|t|) P(T>t)
ROA (P/L before tax) 352 52 No 0.331 0.662 0.669
ROA (Net income) 360 52 Yes 0.475 0.951 0.525
ROE (P/L before tax) 330 46 Yes 0.120 0.240 0.880
ROE (Net income) 334 47 Yes 0.096* 0.193 0.904
ROCE (P/L before tax) 219 37 No 0.725 0.549 0.275
ROCE (Net income) 219 38 Yes 0.350 0.701 0.650
EBIT margin 259 37 No 0.681 0.639 0.320
EBITDA margin 201 34 No 0.581 0.838 0.419
Notes: Firms are divided into two groups according to Top25ARWU dummy. Null hypothesis: average per-
formances of two groups are equal at the year of CEO’s appointment (diff=0). Three alternative hypotheses
are tested. If firms led by alumni of top 25 world’s universities performed better (diff<0), the endogenous
matching is likely to occur. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Table 3e: Testing for endogenous matching for Top25QS
Dependent Top25QS Unequal Ha: diff<0 Ha: diff !=0 Ha: diff>0
variables No Yes variance P(T<t) P(|T|>|t|) P(T>t)
ROA (P/L before tax) 356 48 Yes 0.712 0.576 0.288
ROA (Net income) 363 49 Yes 0.721 0.556 0.278
ROE (P/L before tax) 332 44 Yes 0.259 0.518 0.741
ROE (Net income) 336 45 Yes 0.468 0.937 0.532
ROCE (P/L before tax) 222 34 Yes 0.735 0.530 0.265
ROCE (Net income) 222 35 No 0.796 0.409 0.204
EBIT margin 263 33 No 0.774 0.452 0.226
EBITDA margin 205 30 No 0.702 0.597 0.298
Notes: Firms are divided into two groups according to Top25QS dummy. Null hypothesis: average
performances of two groups are equal at the year of CEO’s appointment (diff=0). Three alternative
hypotheses are tested. If firms led by alumni of top 25 world’s universities performed better (diff<0), the
endogenous matching is likely to occur. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Figure 4: Correlations for ROE (net income)
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Table 4a: Impact of CEO’s education on firm performance
Dependent variables
MBA IvyLeagueGrad MBAIvyLeague
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROA (Net income) 3.99** 4.21** -1.19 -1.92 1.72 2.01
(1.70) (1.67) (1.82) (1.68) (4.39) (4.26)
ROA (P/L before tax) 5.13** 5.40** 0.46 0.24 2.85 2.28
(2.26) (2.29) (2.14) (2.14) (4.88) (4.87)
ROE (Net income) 16.3** 12.6** 0.87 -3.00 -14.4 -21.8*
(7.65) (5.21) (5.98) (5.53) (16.7) (11.2)
EBIT margin 5.08* 4.52 3.51 2.43 2.99 2.78
(2.93) (3.07) (2.33) (2.29) (4.05) (4.04)
EBITDA margin 7.28*** 6.88*** 6.10** 5.98** -1.34 -1.56
(2.40) (2.43) (2.91) (2.91) (4.36) (4.39)
Removed outliers yes yes yes
Country-sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table reports OLS estimates for impact of CEO’s education on firm performance. Pres-
tigious institution is one belonging to Ivy League. Each row corresponds to one of alternative
dependent variables. Typical set of controls (CEO’s demography, ownership, firm characteris-
tics) is included to all specifications. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
Table 4b: Impact of CEO’s education on firm performance
Dependent variables
MBA Top25ARWU MBATop25ARWU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROA (Net income) 4.24** 4.51*** 1.49 1.47 -0.37 -0.51
(1.76) (1.73) (1.95) (1.82) (4.76) (4.66)
ROA (P/L before tax) 5.50** 5.74** 3.62 3.42 0.40 0.18
(2.34) (2.37) (2.34) (2.42) (5.39) (5.41)
ROE (Net income) 16.4** 12.8** 2.61 -0.87 -5.20 -12.8
(7.84) (5.44) (5.44) (4.48) (19.9) (15.6)
EBIT margin 5.55* 5.04 4.91 5.09* -2.53 -2.59
(3.03) (3.17) (3.06) (3.03) (5.75) (5.31)
EBITDA margin 7.57*** 7.23*** 4.74* 5.34** -4.61 -5.00
(2.47) (2.49) (2.55) (2.54) (6.11) (5.98)
Removed outliers yes yes yes
Country-sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table reports OLS estimates for impact of CEO’s education on firm performance. Pres-
tigious institution is one belonging to top 25 in ARWU. Each row corresponds to one of al-
ternative dependent variables. Typical set of controls (CEO’s demography, ownership, firm
characteristics) is included to all specifications. Robust standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Appendix A. Detailed OLS results
Table A1: OLS results for return on equity (ROE) calculated basing on net income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MBA 15.2 10.7 18.4 12.3 16.3 12.6
(7.07) (4.58) (7.32) (4.69) (7.65) (5.21)
IvyLeagueGrad 0.15 -1.83 -0.72 -2.47 0.87 -3.00
(4.96) (4.52) (5.39) (4.44) (5.98) (5.53)
MBAIvyLeague -11.8 -12.5 -16.0 -10.3 -14.4 -21.8
(9.34) (6.85) (10.4) (6.74) (16.7) (11.2)
Age of CEO 0.23 0.049 0.18 0.0099 0.023 -0.21
(0.22) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) (0.28) (0.23)
Male -7.90 -4.58 -11.1 -6.93 -8.23 -7.24
(7.88) (6.98) (8.16) (7.23) (9.71) (8.07)
ShareholderCEO -13.0 -9.79 -11.0 -9.77 -12.3 -8.95
(7.36) (7.11) (7.12) (7.01) (10.1) (10.0)
Majority shareholder -10.3 -7.38 -8.24 -6.07 -11.1 -8.29
(5.81) (4.43) (5.38) (4.34) (7.12) (5.05)
Firm’s age -0.050 -0.038 -0.019 -0.020 -0.0013 0.025
(0.063) (0.052) (0.062) (0.049) (0.077) (0.059)
log(Sales) 0.53 -0.23 0.065 -0.55 0.26 -0.63
(0.96) (0.61) (0.89) (0.59) (1.12) (0.68)
Gearing -0.073 -0.058 -0.073 -0.052 -0.067 -0.053
(0.037) (0.017) (0.039) (0.016) (0.040) (0.019)
Current ratio -1.14 -1.78 -1.03 -1.55 -1.06 -2.06
(0.58) (1.11) (0.54) (1.04) (0.69) (1.39)
Current ratio square 0.020 0.046 0.018 0.032 0.020 0.070
(0.0076) (0.043) (0.0073) (0.046) (0.0089) (0.061)
Constant 25.4 49.2 60.2 40.1 -8.04 21.5
(21.1) (19.0) (27.5) (16.8) (35.7) (45.6)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Sector fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Removed outliers yes yes yes
Observations 515 496 515 496 515 496
R2 0.10 0.092 0.10 0.12 0.21 0.28
Notes: Table reports detailed OLS results. Dependent variable is ROE (Net income). Estimates in
columns 2, 4 and 6 are obtained after exclusion of BACON outliers. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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